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ABSTR ACT
Gene-editing technologies, ie those able to make changes in the DNA of an
organism, are the object of global competition and a regulatory race between
countries and regions. There is an attempt to craft legal frameworks pro-
tective enough for users, but flexible enough for developers of gene-editing
technologies. This article examines the imaginary built into the framing of
EU-level legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies and identifies
its three key related facets: the tension around naturalness; safeguarding
morality and ethics; and the pursuit of medical objectives for the protection
of human health. Concerns around the use of gene-editing technologies in
relation to eugenics and human enhancement have produced a multifaceted
imaginary. We argue that this imaginary not only places a limit on EU-
level regulation, despite a strong EU competence in respect of the internal
market, but also seeks to ensure its legitimation.
K E Y W O R D S: European Union, framing, gene editing, imaginaries, law,
science and technology studies
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I. INTRODUCTION
A global uproar followed the 2018 announcement of Chinese scientist He Jian-Kui1
that he had successfully used CRISPR2 to edit the genes of twin embryos. The resulting
twins, named Lulu and Nana, were born healthy, and with allegedly altered CCR5
genes, giving them resistance to the human immunodeficiency virus (or HIV). One of
the greatest concerns culminating from the announcement is the use of gene-editing3
technologies to modify the human germline. This had been subject to an international
moratorium from scientists at the initiative of the United States of America, United
Kingdom, and China, in 2015.4
The creation of the World Health Organization Expert Advisory Committee on
Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Edit-
ing in 20185 further demonstrates that the concerns around gene editing are now
being progressively addressed at the global level. The European Union (EU) level of
governance6 tends to be missed from discussion of gene-editing technologies within
legal scholarship.7 Indeed, much attention remains on the national level, often in a
1 Henry T. Greely, CRISPR’d Babies: Human Germline Genome Editing in the ‘He Jiankui Affair’, 6 J. Law
Biosci. 111 (2019).
2 CRISPR is the abbreviation for ‘Clustered Regularly Interspaced Palindromic Repeats’ and CRISPR-Cas9
was hailed as the genome editing technology that would change the face of humankind. The CRISPR system
could be programmed to target specific stretches of genetic code and to edit DNA at precise locations and,
therefore, could potentially eradicate more genetic mutations and diseases in the future. See: Patrick D. Hsu,
Eric S. Lander and Feng Zhang, Development and Applications of CRISPR-Cas9 for Genome Engineering, 157
Cell 1262 (2014).
3 The term ‘gene editing’ in this paper may be used interchangeably with the term ‘genome editing’, where
appropriate, particularly in reference to external sources that may use the latter term. We use the term
‘gene editing’ as a targeted address to specific fragments in DNA that contain elements of heredity and the
transmission of heredity processes. The term ‘genome editing’ has generally been used to broadly refer to
the entire collection of DNA in an organism.
4 The 2015 summit led to a statement that opposed clinical use of modifications to the germline affect-
ing the potential offspring, through changes to genes in gametes (sperm and eggs) and embryos, but
approved the clinical use of somatic (body) cell gene therapies, which affect only the individual treated
[Organizing Committee for the International Summit on Human Gene Editing, On Human Gene Editing:
International Summit Statement (2015), https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2015/12/on-human-
gene-editing-international-summit-statement (accessed Sept. 24, 2020)]. Nevertheless, and despite the
uproar over Jian-Kui’s work, the Second International Summit was much more nuanced as it suggested that
there should be a continuation of research and development of gene-editing technologies to treat diseases,
possibly also where there is modification of the human germline, but its clinical use should be banned until
safeguards conditions are met (Organizing Committee for the Second International Summit on Human
Genome Editing, Continuing the Global Discussion Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief (2019), https://
www.nap.edu/read/25343/chapter/1 (accessed Sept. 24, 2020).
5 Dr Emmanuelle Tuerlings, WHO Expert Advisory Committee on Developing Global Standards for Governance
and Oversight of Human Genome Editing 37. For further discussion, see: European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies, EGE Statement on Gene Editing (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/research_and_innovation/ege/gene_editing_ege_statement.pdf (accessed Jan. 2, 2020).
6 The EU’s regulatory order is one level of the multilevel system of governance. Within that system the
EU level interacts with a range of other regulatory orders including those at the national level. See fur-
ther: Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multilevel Governance and European Integration
(2001).
7 For rare exceptions see: Jessica Almqvist and Cesare P. R. Romano, The Regulation of Human Germline
Genome Modification in Europe, in Human Genome Germline Modification and the Right to
Science: A Comparative Study of National Laws and Policies 155 (Andrea Boggio et al. eds.,
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comparative approach,8 or on the international level,9 including linking human rights
law and biotechnologies.10
Nevertheless, EU institutions are in the process of examining and assessing the
issues raised by human gene editing. The European Medicines Agency (EMA)11
and the European Commission, in collaboration with the European Group on Ethics
in Science and Technologies (EGE),12 have organized events, while the European
Parliament has published a note on this topic.13 The Council of the European Union
has considered gene editing in relation to plants.14 The EGE, from which an opinion on
gene editing is awaited, proclaimed in a 2016 statement the need for inclusive debate
that takes into account, among others, ethical principles such as human dignity, justice,
equity, proportionality, and autonomy. Through this instrument of ‘soft’ law, ie an
instrument that is non-binding but still has normative effects, the EGE emphasizes that
‘ethical consideration needs to be given to all applications of gene editing, including the
non-human applications’.15
A developing literature already focuses on the EU-level to highlight a range of legal
regulation, including soft law, relating to gene-editing technologies.16 This literature
explains how EU law applies throughout the development pipeline for these technolo-
gies and health technologies more generally. The pipeline begins with an idea and, if
2020); Ana Nordberg et al., Regulating Germline Editing in Assisted Reproductive Technology: An EU Cross-
Disciplinary Perspective, 34 Bioethics 16 (2020).
8 See for instance: Motoko Araki and Tetsuya Ishii, International Regulatory Landscape and Integration of
Corrective Genome Editing into In Vitro Fertilization, 12 Reprod. Biol. Endocrinol. 108 (2014).
9 Achim Rosemann et al., Heritable Genome Editing in a Global Context: National and International Policy
Challenges, 49 Hastings Cent. Rep. 30 (2019).
10 Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007); New
Technologies and Human Rights (Therese Murphy ed., 2009).
11 EMA, Report of the EMA Expert Meeting on Genome Editing Technologies Used in Medicinal Product Develop-
ment (2018), EMA/47066/2018.
12 European Commission and European Group on Ethics, Open Round Table on the Ethics of Gene Editing
(2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/round-table-ethics-gene-editing-2019-oct-16_en (accessed
June 22, 2020).
13 European Parliament, What If Gene Editing Became Routine Practice? (2018), https://www.europarl.eu
ropa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/624260/EPRS_ATA(2018)624260_EN.pdf (accessed June 22,
2020).
14 Decision (EU) 2019/1904 Requesting the Commission to Submit a Study in Light of the Court of Justice’s
Judgment in Case C-528/16 Confédération paysanne infra note 51. Regarding the Status of Novel Genomic
Techniques Under Union Law, and a Proposal, If Appropriate in View of the Outcomes of the Study, OJ
2019 L 293/103.
15 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, EGE Statement on Gene Editing (2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/research_and_innovation/ege/gene_editing_ege_statement.
pdf (accessed Jan. 2, 2020). On ‘soft’ law, see: Gary E. Marchant and Brad Allenby, Soft law: New Tools
for Governing Emerging Technologies, 73(2) Bull. Atomic Sci. 108 (2017). On the EGE and its ‘soft’ law,
see: Helen Busby et al., Ethical EU Law? The Influence of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies, 33 Eur. L. Rev. 803 (2008).
16 Black defines regulation as ‘the intentional use of authority to affect behaviour of a different party
according to set standards, involving instruments of information-gathering and behaviour modification’—
see: Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 Aust. J. Leg. Philos. 1 (2002), emphasis added.
This understanding of regulation includes ‘hard law’, ‘soft law’, social norms, standards and the market.
See further: Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Regulation—the Field and the Developing
Agenda, in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010); Robert
Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy,
and Practice (2011).
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development is successful, eventually results in a technology for market availability.17
In this article, we focus on the main examples of EU-level ‘hard’ legal regulation, or
fomally binding law, applicable to gene-editing technologies for humans throughout
this pipeline.18 We examine the imaginary of the future, or ‘imagined future’,19 built into
the framing of these main examples of EU-level ‘hard’ legal regulation. In doing so, we
bring the latter literature from legal studies into dialogue with the developing discussion
on imaginaries in science and technology studies (STS) and cognate disciplines. Our
aim is to advance both the literature from legal studies, and the dialogue between it
and STS,20 and in turn to contribute toward awareness of the role of legal regulation in
shaping the imagined future forming at the EU level of governance.
We argue that the facets or elements of a multifaceted imaginary—the tension
around naturalness; safeguarding morality and ethics; and pursuing medical objec-
tives for the protection of human health—are found in the framing of EU-level legal
regulation. Framing involves discursive devices that organize experience, knowledge,
and regulation.21 The facets found in this framing are distributed between various
legal instruments, which when looked at together, form a multifaceted imaginary. All
together these facets conjure a future in which technoscience within the EU is steered
toward innovations that exploit somatic gene editing for new medicinal products, but
avoid editing of the human germ line.
The tension around naturalness is found in the eligibility for patents and the
approach to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Safeguarding morality and
ethics is apparent in the exclusion from patentability of biotechnological inventions
where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; the
ethical review and prohibitions of research activities to be funded in the EU; and the
prohibition of clinical trials that modify the germ line. The facet of pursuing medical
objectives for the protection of human health is seen in maintenance of the exclusion
from patentability of methods of therapeutic, diagnostic, and surgical treatment; and
the incentives for the marketing of products based on gene-editing technologies as
advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs).
The legislation discussed in this article is adopted predominantly under Article
114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).22 This is the
17 Mark L. Flear, Regulating New Technologies: EU Internal Market Law, Risk, and Socio-Technical Order, in New
Technologies and EU Law 74 (Marise Cremona ed., 2017). See the other contributions to the latter
collection and also: European Law and New Health Technologies (Mark L. Flear et al. eds., 2013).
18 We do not, therefore, consider gene-editing technologies relating to plants or animals except where they
relate to our focus on gene-editing technologies for humans.
19 The actual definition refers to ‘imagined futures’—see: Jens Beckert, Imagined Futures: Fictional
Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics (2016).
20 Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power
(Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., 2015). See also: Beckert, Id.; The Handbook of Science
and Technology Studies (Ulrike Felt et al. eds., 2017).
21 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assess-
ment, 26 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 611 (2000); Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the
Organization of Experience (1986); Maarten Hajer and David Laws, Ordering through Discourse, in
The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2008); Vivien A. Schmidt,
Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse, 11 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 303
(2008).
22 Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on Dec. 1, 2009, Article 114 TFEU was Article 95
European Community Treaty, while Article 168 TFEU was Article 152 European Community Treaty.
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main legal base for legislation relating to the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.23 The EU’s legal competence in the public health field, Article 168
TFEU, which is an area of supporting, coordinating, or supplementary competence,24
provides far more limited scope for legislation on gene-editing technologies. The so-
called REACH legislation,25 which is applicable to some new technologies, is not
discussed because it is not applicable to human gene-editing technologies as long as
they are medicinal products.26 Other areas of law that are only very indirectly related
to the regulation of gene-editing technologies, such as competition law, are also not
discussed.27 ‘Soft’ law at the EU level in the area under discussion has not yet fully
emerged. Even if there were ‘soft’ law published to discuss, a comprehensive survey of
it alongside ‘hard’ law would not be possible within a single article. As such, in what
follows, we do not discuss ‘soft’ law.
This article does not examine interactions between national and EU levels of gov-
ernance, including the imaginaries found at each level.28 Such analysis is unnecessary
for this article, which intervenes in discussions on gene-editing technologies to reveal
a multifaceted EU-level imaginary, and underscore its importance in the framing of
instruments of legal regulation at that level of governance. We do not seek to trace
the overlaps, (dis)similarities, and (dis)continuities between the imaginary relating
23 The internal market is defined by Article 26(2) TFEU as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. The establishment of the internal market
is required by Article 3(3) Treaty on European Union (TEU). The internal market also extends to the
European Economic Area, which comprises EU Member States and Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland.
24 Under Article 6(a) TFEU. Article 168 essentially permits limited action in order to tackle serious cross-
border threats to health. Although Article 168(5) TFEU provides that the EU legislature may ‘adopt
incentive measures’ that are designed to, inter alia, ‘protect and improve human health and in particular to
combat the major cross-border health scourges’, this specifically excludes ‘any harmonization of the laws
and regulations of the Member States’. In addition, Article 168(7) TFEU provides the responsibility of
the Member States for the ‘definition of their health policy and for the organization and delivery of health
services and medical care’ is respected. Legislation under Article 114 TFEU and Article 168 TFEU is
adopted using the ordinary legislative procedure set out in Article 294 TFEU.
25 Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction
of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, Amending Directive 1999/45/EC
and Repealing Regulation (EEC) 793/93 and Regulation (EC) 1488/94 as well as Directive
76/769/EEC and Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ 2006 L
136/3; Directive 2006/121/EC amending Directive 67/548/EEC on the Approximation of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of
Dangerous Substances in Order to Adapt it to Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 Concerning the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and Establishing a European Chemicals
Agency, OJ 2006 L 136/281.
26 See Article 2(5)(a) Regulation (EC) 1907/2006, Id., which states that the REACH legislation does not
apply to the extent that a substance is used in medicinal products and Article 2(6), which states that it does
not apply to medical devices, covered by the leges speciales discussed in this article.
27 For example, anti-monopoly laws can determine the feasibility of research into new health technologies, see:
Biotechnologies and International Human Rights, supra note 10; Marcus Pilgerstorfer, EU Law
and Policy on Pharmaceuticals Marketing and Post Market Control including Product Liability, in Research
Handbook on EU Health law and Policy 156 (Tamara K. Hervey et al. eds., 2017); Johan W. van de
Gronden and Catalin S. Rusu, EU Competition Law and Policy and Health Systems, in Research Handbook
on EU Health Law and Policy 267 (Tamara K. Hervey et al. eds., 2017); Aurélie Mahalatchimy,
Regulating Medicines in the European Union, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Health Law
(Tamara K. Hervey and David Orentlicher eds., 2020).
28 See note 6 above.
6 • Framing and legitimating EU legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies
to human gene-editing technologies and that applicable to other new and emerging
technologies.29 These kinds of analyses would require far more space than can be
provided in this article-length piece.
Nevertheless, this article also sheds light on how the multifaceted imaginary found
in the framing of various instruments of legal regulation at the EU level does not
develop de novo but instead may reflect approaches taken at the national level.30
In particular, national approaches to legal regulation of gene editing attempt to
avoid repeating past ideas about eugenics and human enhancement, which led to
the horrors of Nazism. As we shall explain, this is certainly found in the key facet
of safeguarding morality and ethics, in particular, and places a limit on EU-level
regulation in respect of gene editing.31 We do not consider alternative imagined
futures, which may be apparent in, for instance, consultations, proposals, and drafts
of new legislation before the EU’s legislature,32 except where they are relevant to our
argument.
Our central finding is that the facets of an EU-level imaginary are found within
the framing of individual instruments of EU legal regulation and that as a whole,
the imaginary has both regulatory effects and amounts to an attempt to legitimate
that regulation. As part of the frame of this regulation, the multifaceted imaginary
serves to legitimate regulation that steers behaviour toward the development of human
somatic gene-editing technologies. Through this, the imaginary helps to realize the
EU’s market-oriented goals, ie relating to its internal market and economy. In addition,
we suggest that the imaginary found in EU-level regulation may serve to contrast the
EU, and its imagined future and identity, with that taking shape elsewhere, such as in
China. We make our argument by examining each of the key facets of the imaginary in
turn, before concluding with our broader thoughts.
II. FIRST KEY FACET: TENSION AROUND NATURALNESS
We begin by considering the tension around naturalness as it is built into the framing of
EU-level regulation of gene-editing technologies. This is especially apparent in relation
to legislation on patents and GMOs.
29 This could of course form the basis for rich and fruitful further investigation.
30 For discussion, see: R. Alta Charo, The Legal and Regulatory Context for Human Gene Editing|Issues in Science
and Technology (2016) (accessed Jan. 10, 2020); Judit Sándor, The Ethical and Legal Analysis of Embryo
Preimplantation Testing Policies in Europe, in Screening the Single Euploid Embryo 353 (E. Scott
Sills ed., 2015); Julian Savulescu, Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings, in
The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics 516 (Bonnie Steinbock ed., 2007); The Wellborn science:
Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia (Mark B. Adams ed., 1990).
31 For example, in Germany, Article 5 Embryo Protection Act 1990 makes it a punishable offence for a person
to ‘artificially alter the genetic information of a human germline cell’, or who ‘uses a human germline cell with
artificially altered genetic information for the purpose of fertilization’. In France, its Criminal Code makes
eugenic and reproductive cloning crimes against humanity. Furthermore, Article 16–4 French Civil Code
(1804, amended 2017) specifically excludes ‘modification of genetic traits with the purpose of modifying
the germ line’.
32 In the context of the law examined, which is adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, the relevant
procedure for its adoption is Article 294 TFEU, ie the ordinary legislative procedure. This provides the
‘EU legislature’ comprises the European Commission (proposal), the European Parliament and Council
(joint adoption).
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II. A. Patents
Patents are a tool for commercializing an invention and facilitating its translation
from the laboratory bench to clinical prescription and application. The EU’s Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Directive33 (Biotechnology Directive) aims
to steer behaviour and stimulate innovation that recognizes the risks of developing new
technologies and seeks to minimize them. It does so through the incentive of exclusive
rights to benefit from the innovation through patent protection.34 Patents provide a
temporary and territorial monopoly for which the holder can prohibit or authorize
the invention’s exploitation. It is noteworthy that patenting does not authorize the
patent holder to implement that invention but only entitles their exclusive exploitation.
Regardless of whether or not a product is patented, market approval is required for
medical inventions entering the EU market.35 In what follows, we discuss the criteria
for patentability under the Biotechnology Directive and relate them to the tension
around naturalness.
The ability to demonstrate innovation, and distinguish from what occurs in nature,
or naturalness, is crucial to the criteria for patentability.36 These provide that the
innovation must be new or novel, involve an inventive step, and be ‘susceptible of
industrial application’.37 Under these criteria, the isolation or production by means
of a technical process of the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, for instance,
may be a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of
a natural element. Here, the work on a natural element is highlighted for the purpose of
patent. In other words, human intervention by means of ‘a technical process’ transforms
a discovery into an invention. The limits on what inventions can possibly be patented
are of central importance, particularly to gene-editing technologies.
A key recital begins by stating ‘patent law must be applied so as to respect the
fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person’. We shall
return to this point later on, where we consider it in relation to safeguarding morality
and ethics as the second key facet of the imaginary underpinning the framing of EU law
in this area. What is of importance here is the overlap of this moral and ethical facet with
the tension around naturalness itself as a limit to patentability. This is made apparent in
the next part of the recital:
‘the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and
the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence
or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be patented.’
33 Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13.
34 Amanda Odell-West, Exclusions in Patent Law as an Indirect Form of Regulation of New Health Technologies
in Europe, in European Law and New Health Technologies (Mark L. Flear et al. eds., 2017). See
also: Tamara K. Hervey and Hari Black, The European Union and the Governance of Stem Cell Research, 12
Maastricht J. Eur. Comp. Law 3 (2005).
35 Recital 14 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) deals with the
evaluation and supervision of medicinal products authorized at the European level in the EU.
36 For discussion, see: Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane Nielsen and Dianne Nicol, Patenting Nature—A Comparative
Perspective, 5 J. Law Biosci. 550 (2018).
37 Article 3 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33.
8 • Framing and legitimating EU legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies
The recital concludes by stating ‘these principles are in line with the criteria of
patentability proper to patent law, whereby a mere discovery cannot be patented’.38 Here,
we can see that patentability relies upon a certain degree of human intervention that
serves to distinguish an invention from a discovery.
Building on the above statement, another recital states:
‘Whereas, therefore, it should be made clear that an invention based on an element isolated
from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, which is susceptible
of industrial application, is not excluded from patentability, even where the structure of that
element is identical to that of a natural element, given that the rights conferred by the patent
do not extend to the human body and its elements in their natural environment.’39
This indicates that an invention can be based on the act of ‘isolating’ an element
from the human body. This further underscores the significance of the tension around
naturalness as a key facet of the imaginary found within the framing of this legisla-
tion. ‘Invention’ is distinguished from—and indeed leverages—that which is naturally
occurring. But rights in relation to the invention do not extend to its source in nature:
the human body and its elements.
This distinction between naturalness and invention thus provides the basis for the
former as the first key facet of the imaginary embedded in the framing of EU-level
legal regulation. The key facet, as part of framing, makes it possible to construct the
legislation, including its rationale and detailed provisions. The recitals that frame the
EU’s legislation state ‘in the field of genetic engineering, research and development
require a considerable amount of high-risk investment and therefore only adequate legal
protection can make them profitable’.40 The pre-emption of diverse national patent pro-
tection regimes and the establishment of a single EU-level regime for biotechnological
inventions is aimed at reducing the risks to investments made by developers.
Since Article 114 TFEU is the legal basis of this legislation, it is ultimately justified by
the idea that differences in the legal protection of biotechnological inventions between
countries within the internal market would create barriers to trade.41 This rationale
was challenged in Netherlands v Parliament and Council (Biotechnology).42 However,
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) found that the Biotechnology Directive ‘in fact
aims to prevent damage to the unity of the internal market which might result from the
Member States’ deciding unilaterally to grant or refuse such protection’.43 This rationale
was affirmed elsewhere in the Biotechnology Directive:
38 Recital 16, Id. Also see Article 5(1) Id. (emphasis added).
39 Recital 20, Id. Also see Article 5(2) Id. (emphasis added). In addition, Recital 21 Id. states ‘Whereas such
an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced is not excluded from patentability since it is, for
example, the result of technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and to reproduce it outside the
human body, techniques which human beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which nature
is incapable of accomplishing by itself’ (emphasis added). For discussion, see: Alice Yuen-Ting Wong and
Aurélie Mahalatchimy, Human Stem Cells Patents—Emerging Issues and Challenges in Europe, United States,
China, and Japan, 21 J. World Intellect. Prop. 326–355 (2018).
40 Recital 2 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
41 Recitals 5, 6 and 7, Id.
42 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079 (ECLI:EU:C:2001:523).
43 Id., para. 18.
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‘uncoordinated development of national laws on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions in the [EU] could lead to further disincentives to trade, to the detriment of
the industrial development of such inventions and of the smooth operation of the internal
market.’44
The market-oriented rationale for the Biotechnology Directive focuses on a harmo-
nized approach to protecting biotechnological inventions within the internal market.
As a key facet of the imagined future to be brought into being through this legislation,
the tension around naturalness operates to provide the understanding of inventions that
are eligible for protection for commercial exploitation, and legitimate this instrument
of legal regulation.
II. B. Genetically Modified Organisms
The tension around naturalness, as a key facet of the imaginary within the framing of
EU legal regulation, is also apparent in the GMO Directive. Our focus here is on the
tension around naturalness as it provides the very foundation for the understanding of
GMOs and the scope of the GMO Directive. Under this Directive, GMOs are defined
such that it ‘means an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or
natural recombination’.45 The GMO Directive applies to the ‘deliberate release into the
environment’ or ‘placing on the market . . . as or in products’ of GMOs.46 The GMO
Directive is usually applicable to food, but it is also relevant to ATMPs that use GMOs,
ie gene editing, which are developed and marketed within the EU.
ATMPs that are, or consist of, GMOs, would be covered by both the ATMP leg-
islation (which is considered in the next section) and the GMO legislation. Indeed,
the GMO Directive remains relevant in that it contains requirements in relation to
clinical trials and an equivalent environment risk assessment for ATMPs that are, or
consist of, GMOs.47 These requirements are in addition to those required for other
ATMPs. ATMPs that are, or consist of, GMOs as defined in the GMO Directive, are
being developed. Moreover, among ATMPs authorized thus far, gene therapy medic-
inal products usually contain GMOs. For instance, Zolgensma, a recent gene therapy
medicinal product that has obtained a marketing authorization valid throughout the
EU from May 18, 2020, is a genetically modified vector48 infused into a vein to treat
spinal muscular atrophy for patients with inherited mutations affecting specific genes.49
Within the GMO Directive, and by contrast with the approach under the Biotech-
nology Directive, naturalness is juxtaposed against artificialness rather than invention.
44 Recital 7 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
45 Article 2(2) Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically
Modified Organisms and Repealing Directive 90/220/EEC, OJ 2001 L 106/1 (emphasis added). There
is another piece of legislation, see: Directive 2009/41/EC on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified
Micro-Organisms, OJ 2009 L 125/75.
46 Article 1, Directive 2001/18/EC, Id.
47 Article 5, Id. Also see EMA, Guideline on Environmental Risk Assessments for Medical Products Consisting of,
or Containing, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), EMEA/CHMP/BWP/473191/2006—Corr.
48 A vector is an administration system for gene transfer that can be viral or non-viral. Zolgensma is a
genetically modified adenoviral vector.
49 Spinal muscular atrophy is a serious condition of the nerves that causes muscle wasting and weakness. EMA,
Zolgensma, European Public Assessment Report (2020), EMA/200482/2020.
10 • Framing and legitimating EU legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies
The very definition of GMO, noted above, refers to the alteration of genetic material
‘in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’.50 Here,
that which is artificial is understood in relation to what it is ‘not’, ie it does not occur
naturally. Naturalness is given a precise meaning as occurring through mating and/or
natural recombination. Put differently, the tension around naturalness is that which
gives meaning to and makes possible an understanding of artificialness.
This operation of the tension around naturalness has also been recently seen in the
CJEU’s jurisprudence on the GMO Directive. In Confédération paysanne and Others v
Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Agriculture, de l’Agroalimentaire et de la Forêt, the CJEU
considered whether products based on the gene-editing technique mutagenesis fall
within the GMO Directive. The CJEU held that organisms obtained by mutagenesis,
including through gene editing such as CRISPR techniques, are to be classified as
GMOs, as long as the techniques and methods of mutagenesis alter the genetic material
of an organism in a way that does not occur naturally.51
Although this jurisprudence has been adopted for GMOs in plants, it can be foreseen
that the same reasoning should also be applicable, at least in principle, for methods of
mutagenesis in human genetic material.52 In addition, the judgment also makes clear
how the distinction between what is natural or not—ie the tension around naturalness
as a facet of the imaginary found in the framing of the GMO Directive—is ultimately
a legal construction, and one that also operates as a tool of legitimation. Indeed, the
tension around naturalness, specifically, where naturalness is juxtaposed against and
gives rise to an understanding of artificialness, underpins and legitimates the very
classification of GMO.
Legally distinct from a GMO, an organism is defined as ‘any biological entity capable
of replication or of transferring genetic material’53 and falls outside the scope of the
GMO Directive. However, the CJEU found that it follows organisms obtained by
means of techniques/methods of mutagenesis must be considered as ‘altered in a way
that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination’, as per the
definition of GMOs noted above.
To support its reasoning, the CJEU applied its usual teleological and purposive
method of interpretation to reflect on the ‘general scheme’54 of the GMO Directive
as one of the factors used in its interpretation. The general scheme also juxtaposes
naturalness with artificialness, organisms with GMOs. Indeed, as the CJEU found,
Annex 1 A, Part 1, of the GMO Directive provides that genetic modification ‘occurs
at least through the use of the techniques listed there’. More particularly, while Part 1
‘does not explicitly refer to techniques/methods of mutagenesis, that fact is not such
as to exclude organisms obtained by means of those techniques/methods from coming under
the definition of a GMO . . . ’.55 The inclusion of inter alia in the first sentence of Part 1
50 Emphasis added.
51 Case C-528/16 Confédération paysanne and Others v. Premier ministre and Ministre de l’Agriculture, de
l’Agroalimentaire et de la Forêt [2018] (ECLI:EU:C:2018:583).
52 This should be confirmed in the forthcoming study of the European Commission regarding the status of
novel genomic techniques under Union law in light of the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case C-528/16,
Id., as requested by the Council of the EU.
53 Article 2(1) Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 45.
54 C-528/16 Confédération paysanne and Others, supra note 51, at para 31 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at para. 34 (emphasis added).
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was taken in its literal and accurate meaning to provide ‘the list of genetic modification
techniques in that part is not exhaustive’, and as such ‘that list cannot be regarded as
excluding genetic modification techniques other than those to which it specifically refers’.56
The upshot, therefore, is that organisms obtained by means of techniques/methods
of mutagenesis fall within the definition of GMO under this legislation. The GMO
Directive does not, however, apply to organisms obtained through certain mutagenesis
techniques. That is, those techniques/methods that have conventionally been used in
several applications and have accumulated a long safety record.57 According to the
CJEU, the latter does not exclude from the scope of the GMO Directive, ‘organisms
obtained by means of new techniques/methods of mutagenesis which have appeared or have
been mostly developed since Directive 2001/18 was adopted’.58 Another interpretation
‘would fail to have regard to the intention of the EU legislature’.59 Here, it appears
that the naturalness of organisms is maintained thanks to conventional use and a long
safety record, notwithstanding any potential hint of artificialness arising through the
techniques/methods through which they are obtained. The track record of safety,
accumulated through several applications, seems central to the maintenance of natu-
ralness for these organisms, at least in terms of their formal legal classification. By being
demonstrably safe, these organisms appear analogous to others and distinguishable
from GMOs, which require oversight to ensure their safe development.
The tension around naturalness not only provides a basis for the specific legal
provisions in the GMO Directive, but it also links to the rationale for the legislation
and its legitimation. The rationale is again market-oriented, since the GMO Directive
is based on Article 114 TFEU. Specifically, it is:
‘necessary to approximate the laws of the [Member States] . . . concerning the deliberate
release into the environment of GMOs and to ensure the safe development of industrial
products utilising GMOs.’60
The divide between naturalness and artificialness makes possible—or perhaps is the
consequence of —an assumption that the harms or hazards that may arise from GMOs
can be controlled.61 Put differently, what is artificial (GMOs) and natural (certain
organisms, even despite their genetic modification and according to the methods used)
56 Id. at para 35 (emphasis added).
57 C-528/16 Confédération paysanne and Others, supra note 51, at para. 37. In reaching this view, the CJEU
refers to specifc parts of Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 45, ie Recital 17, which provides as much
and is used by the CJEU to interpret Article 3(1), relating to exemptions, that the GMO Directive does
not apply to organisms obtained through the techniques of genetic modification listed in Annex I B to that
directive, including these certain kinds of mutagenesis. Thus, the Member States remain free (under their
laws) to subject such organisms to the obligations laid down by the GMO Directive or to other obligations,
consistent with the free movement of goods, especially under Articles 34–36 TFEU [prohibition on
restrictions on free movement (Articles 34 and 35) subject to derogations on the grounds of inter alia public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants
(Article 36)]. See: Aurelie Mahalatchimy, Genome Editing and the European Union, in Genome Editing
and the Law Around the World ( Judit Sandor ed., 2019).
58 Id. at para 51 (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 Recital 7 Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 45.
61 For discussion, see: Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New
Technology (2008).
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is distinguished within the law. What is artificial is deemed susceptible to control so
as to ensure safety. What is natural is implicitly deemed safe and thus control through
legal regulation is not necessary. In summary, the CJEU’s decision further refines and
embeds the tension around naturalness within the framing of the GMO Directive. This
tension becomes a key tool of legitimation and part of the larger imaginary of EU legal
regulation of gene-editing technologies.
The framing of both the Biotechnology Directive and GMO Directive reflects
the tension around naturalness. Within the former, the tension around naturalness
provides the basis upon which inventions are constructed and understood as eligible for
protection through patents. Within the latter, the tension around naturalness operates
in a similar way by providing the ground upon which artificialness is constructed and
understood as the basis for legislation (on GMOs). In summary, the tension around
naturalness is foundational and facilitative of both the Biotechnology Directive and the
GMO Directive. The tension around naturalness found in the framing of these pieces
of legislation is the first part of the multifaceted imaginary on gene-editing technologies
found at the EU level of legal regulation.
III. SECOND KEY FACET: SAFEGUARDING MORALITY AND ETHICS
The second key facet of the imaginary, safeguarding morality and ethics, is apparent in
what is regarded as moral or ethical to be patented; what research can be funded by the
EU research framework programmes; and the products that can be commercialized as
gene-editing technologies in Europe. These considerations are found in EU legislation
on patents, research funding, and clinical trials for ATMPs.
III. A. Patents
The Biotechnology Directive also reflects another key facet of the imaginary built into
the framing of EU-level regulation of gene-editing technologies: safeguarding morality
and ethics. The latter is apparent in several recitals that frame the Biotechnology Direc-
tive and become further concretized in Article 6.62 This specific provision provides that
inventions are to be ‘considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would
be contrary to ordre public or morality’.63 To assist in the interpretation of this provision,
there is a non-exhaustive and indicative list of processes to which the exclusion from
patentability applies. We discuss this list, since it is through it that safeguarding morality
and ethics operates and becomes further embedded within the framing and content of
the Biotechnology Directive.
The first three items on the list relate directly to humans bodies and their elements.
Certain types of intervention in human bodies and their elements are considered
immoral and unethical. The second of these relates most directly to gene-editing
technologies, since it mentions ‘processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of
human beings’.64 The first item is also relevant in that it relates to the human genome by
62 Recitals 36–40 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33.
63 Article 6, Id. (emphasis added). The morality clause in Article 53(a) European Patent Convention has been
revised so that it corresponds to the Directive, see Rules 23b–23e of the Implementing Regulations. For
critical comment on this change, see Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity
in Bioethics and Biolaw 197, 199 (2002).
64 Article 6(2)(b) Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33, reflecting Recital 40 (emphasis added).
Framing and legitimating EU legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies • 13
excluding from patentability ‘processes for cloning human beings’.65 The third item
relates to the human genome, albeit more indirectly, in that it excludes from patentabil-
ity inventions that involve ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial pur-
poses’. Notably, this exclusion does not apply to inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic
purposes.66 The final item on the list is also relevant to gene-editing technologies for
humans; in that, it relates to a risk/benefit test, stating that ‘processes for modifying the
genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial
medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes’.67
In these ways, safeguarding morality and ethics, a key facet of the imagined future
found at the EU-level of governance, appears in the framing and specific provisions
of the Biotechnology Directive. This key facet operates to exclude from patentability
gene-editing technologies that modify or relate to the human germ line in particular.
Although the list of processes to which the exclusion from patentability applies is
non-exhaustive,68 it also implies that, subject to the medical treatment exception to
patentability, which we discuss in the next section, certain processes for human gene
editing may be patentable.69 Indeed, commercial exploitation of inventions ‘could be’
moral and ethical, and thus ‘patentable’, provided that they ‘do not’ modify the human
germ line, result in its cloning in human beings or use through human embryos.
CJEU jurisprudence on the indicative list of processes to which the exclusion from
patentability under Article 6 Biotechnology Directive applies, further embeds and
stabilizes the safeguarding of morality and ethics within the framing of the legislation
and, in turn, as a key facet of the wider imaginary of the future found at the EU level.
In Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace, the CJEU clarified the meaning of ‘human embryo’ in
Article 6. The CJEU observed, consistent with its earlier decision in Netherlands v
Parliament and Council (Biotechnology), that while the ‘the text of the Directive does
not define human embryo’, the term:
‘must be regarded, for the purposes of application of the Directive, as designating an
autonomous concept of European Union law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner
throughout the territory of the Union.’70
Having determined that there must be an EU-specific meaning of ‘human embryo’,
but wary that ‘the definition of human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in
many Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems’,71 the
CJEU built on the indicative list. It did so by underlining its role in the reference
procedure from the national court for interpretation of EU law, ie in this case, Article
6 Biotechnology Directive.72 The reference meant that the CJEU could not ‘broach
65 Article 6(2)(a) Id., reflecting Recital 40 (emphasis added).
66 Article 6(2)(c) Id., reflecting Recital 42 (emphasis added).
67 Article 6(2)(d) Id., reflecting Recital 45 (emphasis added).
68 Recital 38, Id.
69 As such in principle, the criterion of an invention being ‘susceptible of industrial application’, under Article
3(1) Id. could apply even where there is no commercial application.
70 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace [2011] ECR I-9821 (ECLI:EU:C:2011:669), at para. 26
(emphasis added).
71 Id. at para 30.
72 The preliminary reference procedure, in particular Article 267(b) TFEU.
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questions of a medical or ethical nature’, and as such it ‘must restrict itself to a legal
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the [Biotechnology] Directive’.73
The absence of a definition of ‘human embryo’ in the Biotechnology Directive or
wider EU law meant that the CJEU had to construct one through its usual teleological
and purposive approach to interpretation, which was mentioned above. In this case,
reference to and application of this approach led the CJEU to refer to the rationale for
the Biotechnology Directive provided in the recitals:74
‘the preamble to the Directive states that although it seeks to promote investment in
the field of biotechnology, use of biological material originating from humans must be
consistent with regard for fundamental rights and, in particular, the dignity of the person. Recital
16 in the preamble to the Directive, in particular, emphasizes that “patent law must be
applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of
the person”.’75
Fleeting references elsewhere in the Biotechnology Directive76 do not include any
to the provisions on human dignity and integrity of the person in the EU’s Charter
of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter).77 At the time of the Biotechnology Directive’s
introduction, the latter had not been drafted, and it was only given equal status to
the TFEU and Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 2009.78 However, since 2009,
provisions of EU law must be interpreted by the CJEU, and applied by the other
institutions and Member States when implementing EU law, in light of the EU Charter
as a primary source of law.79 Absent references to the EU Charter, it appears the CJEU
thought references within Biotechnology Directive itself were sufficient to ensure that
it could perform its duty to interpret Article 6.80
The CJEU made references to the recitals inter alia the statement that ‘processes,
the use of which offend against human dignity . . . are obviously also excluded from
patentability’.81 In light of these references, the CJEU found that Biotechnology
73 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, at para. 30 (emphasis added). In this regard the CJEU referred
to Case C-506/06 Sabine Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-1017.
74 The CJEU referenced its approach to interpretation by stating it the meaning of the term ‘must be
determined by considering, inter alia, the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which
they form part’—Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, at para. 31.
75 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, at para. 32 (emphasis added).
76 Instead, there is reference to fundamental rights as provided for in the European Convention on Human
Rights and the general principles of EU law (drawn from national constitutional traditions) (Directive,
at para. 43), and ethical principles as advised by the European Commission’s advisory European Group on
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33, at para. 44).
77 Articles 1 and 3, respectively, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), OJ
2012 C 326/391. Both provisions are informed by Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament
and Council, supra note 42. Article 3 is also informed by Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
adopted by the Council of Europe (ETS 164 and additional protocol ETS 168) (also known as the Oviedo
Convention). Only a handful of EU Member States are not State Parties to the Oviedo Convention—
including Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the former Member State (as of 31 Jan. 2020) of the United
Kingdom. See: Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303/17.
78 The EU Charter was given equal status to the Treaties under Article 6 TEU, under the Treaty of Lisbon,
which came into force on Dec. 1, 2009.
79 Article 51 EU Charter, supra note 77.
80 The CJEU’s role is set out in Article 19 TEU.
81 Recital 38 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33.
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Directive’s ‘context and aim . . . show that the EU legislature intended to exclude any
possibility of patentability [of human embryos] where respect for human dignity could
thereby be affected’.82 Consequently, the CJEU ruled that it ‘follows that the concept of
“human embryo” within the meaning of . . . [the indicative list in the Directive] must
be understood in a wide sense’.83
Of course, the creation of a definition of ‘human embryo’ in EU internal market law,
through the Biotechnology Directive, and one that the CJEU revised in International
Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents,84 is an important consequence
of the legislation.85 But the CJEU’s insistence that there had to be such a definition,
and the rationale for it gives insight into the operation of the safeguarding of morality
and ethics as a key facet of the imaginary underpinning EU legal regulation of gene-
editing technologies. In particular, development of the ‘human embryo’ exception to
the Biotechnology Directive centralizes human dignity, as found in the recitals framing
the legislation, as an integral component of the safeguarding of morality and ethics. It
has been argued elsewhere that the CJEU has taken ‘at least impliedly, a moral stance’.86
Moreover, as such the CJEU has been criticized for ‘refusing to say it refers to ethics
while it does’.87 While we accept these points, our analysis makes clear how the legal
interpretation adopted by the CJEU allows it to use human dignity—ie safeguarding
morality and ethics as part of a wider imaginary—as a legitimating support for EU
involvement and a restrictive approach in all patenting relating to the human embryo,
which of course includes gene-editing techniques applied to the human embryo.
In this way, the CJEU’s jurisprudence both refines and further embeds and con-
structs the safeguarding of morality and ethics within the framing of the Biotechnology
Directive and, in turn, as a key facet of the EU-level imaginary relating to gene-editing
82 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, at para. 34 (emphasis added).
83 Id., para. 34. At para. 36, the CJEU held that the classification ‘human embryo’ applies to, eg ‘a non-fertilized
human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and a non-
fertilized human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis’.
The criterion for determining whether these fall within the term ‘human embryo’ is that they are ‘capable
of commencing the process of development of a human being just as an embryo created by fertilization of
an ovum can do so’.
84 See Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents [2014]
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451), where the CJEU followed the opinion of its Advocate General in order to qualify
the criterion in para. 36 of Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, further. The CJEU held that the
criterion must be understood as meaning a non-fertilized human ovum must have the ‘inherent capacity
to develop into a human being’ (at para. 28). As such ‘where a non-fertilized human ovum does not fulfil
that condition, the mere fact that that organism commences a process of development is not sufficient for
it to be regarded as a “human embryo”’ (at para. 29). Thus, where ‘an unfertilised human ovum whose
division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis did have the capacity to develop
into a human being’ it is to be classified as a ‘human embryo’ and cannot be patented (as in Case C-34/10
Oliver Brüstle, supra note 70, at para. 31). But where ‘according to current scientific knowledge, a human
parthenote, due to the effect of the technique used to obtain it, is not as such capable of commencing the
process of development which leads to a human being’, it is not to be classified as a ‘human embryo’ and can
be patented (as in Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation, at para. 33 and para. 37).
85 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation, Id., para. 27, citing Recitals 3 and 5–7 Directive
98/44/EC, supra note 33.
86 Enrico Bonadio, Stem Cells Industry and Beyond: What is the Aftermath of Brüstle?, 3 Eur. J. Risk Regul. 93
(2012).
87 Brice de Malherbe and Jean- Christophe Galloux, L’Arrêt Brüstle: de la Régulation du Marché à l’Expression
des Valeurs, 9 Propriete Industrielle 7 (2012), at 11.
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technologies. As such the facet of safeguarding morality and ethics further legitimates
and justifies the Biotechnology Directive, and its rationale of fostering the internal
market and competitiveness of the EU’s domestic biotechnology industry. Safeguard-
ing morality and ethics helps to steer the EU’s patenting field toward certain types of
inventions such as that using adult cells.88 Trade secrets over manufacturing processes
thus become increasingly critical in light of the limitations on patentability.89 The EU’s
intellectual property law provides that any invention using gene-editing techniques
could, therefore, be legitimately exploited and marketed within the internal market as
an ATMP. We develop this point further below.
III. B. Research Funding and Clinical Trials
Safeguarding morality and ethics, as a key facet of the EU-level imaginary built into
the framing of legal regulation of gene-editing technologies, is also clearly apparent in
the EU’s framework for funding research and legislation on clinical trials. Both of these
essentially relate to research processes and are therefore considered together.
Regarding the funding of research, the EU adopts multi-annual Framework Pro-
grammes (FPs) to support research and technological development. These FPs con-
tain an obligation to comply with the ethical requirements, with ethical review of all
research projects to be funded, as well as specific prohibitions that have been clarified
over time.90 The current Regulation establishing Horizon 2020—the latest FP for
research and innovation (2014–2020)91—requires compliance with ‘ethical principles
and relevant national, Union and international legislation, including the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human
Rights and its Supplementary Protocols’.92 This legislation also excludes from EU
funding:
‘(a) research activity aiming at human cloning for reproductive purposes; (b) research
activity intended to modify the genetic heritage of human beings which could make such
changes heritable (21); (c) research activities intended to create human embryos solely for
the purpose of research or for the purpose of stem cell procurement, including by means
of somatic cell nuclear transfer.’93
In addition to these limitations, the EU does not fund research prohibited in all Member
States or in particular Member States. For instance, research on embryonic stem cells
can be funded in some countries where they are allowed, and not in the ones where
88 Alison Abbott, Stem Cells: The Cell Division, 480 Nature 7377 (2000).
89 Stephen Jenei, EU’s Court of Justice: Stem Cells Unpatentable If An Embryo Is Destroyed, Patent
Baristas (2011), http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2011/10/24/eus-court-of-justice-stem-ce
lls-unpatentable-if-an-embryo-is-destroyed/(accessed Aug. 5, 2020).
90 For a more detailed presentation of EU legislation on funding for new health technologies, see: Estelle Bros-
set and Aurelie Mahalatchimy, EU Law and Policy on New Health Technologies, in Research Handbook in
EU Health Law and Policy 197 (Tamara K. Hervey et al. eds., 2017).
91 Regulation (EU) 1291/2013 Establishing Horizon 2020—the Framework Programme for Research and
Innovation (2014–2020) and Repealing Decision 1982/2006/EC, OJ 2013 L347/104.
92 Article 19(1), Id.
93 Article 19(3), Id.
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they are forbidden, as long as the exclusion of funding in (c) above does ‘not prevent
[EU] funding of subsequent steps involving human embryonic stem cells’.94
With these clear limitations, the current FP reflects the safeguarding of morality and
ethics. This facet of the imagined future of gene-editing technologies to be brought
into being by EU-level legal regulation limits the scope of EU funding of research into
them, and through these limitations legitimates EU involvement. Indeed, there are
double restrictions on research on human germline editing: the exclusion regarding
the heritability of gene modification; and the exclusion regarding the creation of human
embryos solely for the purpose of research or for the purpose of stem cell procurement.
As for clinical trials, they are subject to specific regulation, with the Clinical Trials
Directive95 dating from 2001 being replaced by the new Clinical Trials Regulation.96
The latter entered into force on June 16, 2014, but is unlikely to come into operation
before 2021, until an audit demonstrates the various technical systems described below
can function.97 In what follows, we refer to the Clinical Trials Regulation, as the relevant
parts for our discussion continue the approach under the Clinical Trials Directive.
We focus on the scope, purpose, and rationale for the Clinical Trials Regulation, and
subsequently the protections it provides for trial participants. We explain how each of
these relates to safeguarding morality and ethics and through it legitimating regulation
in relation to gene-editing technologies.
The Clinical Trials Regulation maintains the provision in the Clinical Trials Direc-
tive that ‘no gene therapy trials may be carried out which result in modifications to the
subject’s germ line genetic identity’.98 The ATMP Regulation reflects this through its
own specific provision.99 Within these clear limits, relating directly to safeguarding
morality and ethics, ie that somatic gene therapy trials are permitted, the Clinical
Trials Regulation provides for the planning, performance, reporting, and archiving of
quality, safety, and efficacy data on gene-editing technologies for their marketing and
commercialization as ATMPs.100
The purpose and rationale of the Clinical Trials Regulation relate to the key facet
of safeguarding morality and ethics. Indeed, the very definition of clinical trials in the
94 Point 12 of the European Commission, Statement on Article 19 Regulation (EU) 1291/2013, Id.; European
Commission, Annex to the Legislative Resolution: Statements by the Commission [on the Horizon 2020—
Framework Programme for research and innovation] (2013), www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pu
bRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0499+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed Sep. 24, 2020). For
the principle, see Article 19(4) Regulation (EU) 1291/2013, supra note 91.
95 Directive 2001/20/EC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
of the Member States relating to the Implementation of Good Clinical Practice in the Conduct of Clinical
Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, OJ 2001 L 121/34. This requires the European Commission
to establish principles relating to GCP and detailed rules in line with those principle.
96 Regulation (EU) 536/2014 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, and Repealing
Directive 2001/20/EC, OJ 2014 L 158/1.
97 Under Article 99, Id., the legislation shall not apply earlier than 28 May 2016. Directive 2001/20/EC,
supra note 95 continues to apply in a transitional period, see Article 98, Id. See further: https://ec.eu
ropa.eu/health/human-use/clinical-trials/regulation_en (accessed Sep. 24, 2020).
98 Recital 75, Article 90 Regulation (EU) 536/2014, Id (emphasis added).
99 Article 4 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 on Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products and Amending
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) 726/2004, OJ 2007 L 324/121, citing Article 9(6)
Directive 2001/20/EC, supra note 95 which is now found in Article 90 Regulation (EU) 536/2014,
supra note 96.
100 As noted in Recital 16 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, Id.
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Clinical Trials Regulation highlights their alignment to the requirements for marketing
and the overriding focus of that on product safety for humans. This focus amounts
to an instantiation of the key facet of safeguarding morality and ethics. Under the
Clinical Trials Regulation, clinical trials are clarified as being a type of clinical study101
(which includes for ATMPs102), ie an investigation of medicinal products in humans
that essentially attempts to ascertain ‘the safety and/or efficacy of those medicinal
products’.103
A large part of the rationale for the adoption of the Clinical Trials Regulation
also reflects the key facet of safeguarding morality and ethics. Experience under the
Clinical Trials Directive gave rise to concerns that differences in its application in the
EU’s (now) 27 Member States104 would undermine scientific research.105 Factors that
may undermine scientific research, including multi-center trials in different Member
States,106 make it harder to meet moral and ethical obligations relating to the pursuit
and refinement of knowledge for medical benefit.
In order to make the latter possible, and meet the moral and ethical obligations
intrinsic to scientific research, it became necessary to revise the applicable law through
the adoption of the Clinical Trials Regulation. The latter introduces an EU portal107
that serves as a single entry point for the submission of an application for the autho-
rization of clinical trials within Member States,108 and an EU database for the storage
101 Article 2(2)(1) Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96 provides ‘clinical study’ ‘means any inves-
tigation in relation to humans intended: (a) to discover or verify the clinical, pharmacological or other
pharmacodynamic effects of one or more medicinal products; (b) to identify any adverse reactions to one
or more medicinal products; or (c) to study the absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of one
or more medicinal products; with the objective of ascertaining the safety and/or efficacy of those medicinal
products’.
102 Article 2(1)(a) Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99 defines ATMPs as any of the following
medicinal products for human use: a gene therapy medicinal product as defined in Part IV Annex I
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, OJ
2001 L 311/67; a somatic cell therapy medicinal product, as defined in Part IV Annex I Directive
2001/83/EC; a tissue engineered product, as further clarified in Article 2(1)(b) and (c) Regulation (EC)
1394/2007.
103 The definition in Article 2(2)(1) REGULATION (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96, cited in supra note 101,
is very similar to that under Article 2(a) Directive 2001/20/EC, supra note 95, particularly the objective:
a ‘clinical trial’ means ‘any investigation in human subjects intended to discover or verify the clinical,
pharmacological, and/or other pharmacodynamic effects of one or more investigational medicinal product
(s), and/or to identify any adverse reactions to one or more investigational medicinal product (s) and/or to
study absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion of one or more investigational medicinal product
(s) with the object of ascertaining its (their) safety and/or efficacy’ (emphasis added).
104 Up from 15 in 2001—and 28 prior to the UK’s withdrawal from the bloc on Jan. 31, 2020. Regulation
(EU) 536/2014, supra note 96, on clinical trials, like other internal market law also applies in the non-EU
members of the European Economic Area: Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. See supra note 23.
105 Since around the mid-1980s, the preference was to opt for the adoption of directives rather than regulations,
and yet, the increase in the number of Member States and diversity in their legal cultures (including in
implementation and compliance with EU law) has led to a more general growing preference for regulations.
106 Recital 4 Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96.
107 Arts 5, 16, and 80, Id.
108 In the first instance, the trial sponsor shall propose the reporting Member State. In the event that this
proposal is declined, more detailed rules determine which Member State shall report: see Article 5, Id.
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of the application and related data.109 The EU portal also provides the means for
communication of, inter alia, the result of the application.110
To introduce these changes, make it easier to generate safety data, and in turn, fulfil
moral and ethical obligations relating to scientific research, it was also necessary to
reconsider the form of the legislative instrument on clinical trials.111 As summarized in
the Clinical Trials Regulation, the adoption of a regulation ‘would present advantages
for sponsors and investigators, for example in the context of clinical trials taking place in
more than one Member State, since they will be able to rely on its provisions directly [before
national courts]’.112 In contrast, the Clinical Trials Directive (as a directive) could only
be relied upon directly in very specific circumstances.113 This meant that in most cases,
domestic implementing legislation was applicable.114
The adoption of an EU regulation (the Clinical Trials Regulation) more uniformly
harmonizes and enhances the efficacy and uniformity of EU law. This in turn makes it
easier to meet moral and ethical obligations relating to the pursuit and refinement of
knowledge for medical benefit. In these various ways, a large part of the rationale for
the adoption of the Clinical Trials Regulation also reflects and embeds the key facet
of safeguarding morality and ethics. This is both as a general concern for scientific
research, but also as it forms part of the EU-level imaginary framing legal regulation
of gene-editing technologies.
The key facet of safeguarding morality and ethics is also apparent in the dual legal
basis for the adoption of the Clinical Trials Regulation: Article 114 TFEU and Article
168(4)(c) TFEU, which provide objectives that are ‘pursued simultaneously’ and
‘one is not secondary to another’.115 This joint legal basis provides that the Clinical
Trials Regulation is aimed at ensuring the good functioning of the internal market
and the establishment of high standards of quality and safety for medicinal products,
109 Article 81, Id.
110 Article 8, Id.
111 Consistent with the legal basis for internal market legislation under Article 114 TFEU.
112 Recital 5 Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96 (emphasis added). Article 288 TFEU defines
directives and regulations. A directive is ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’. In contrast,
a regulation has ‘general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States’.
113 Under the doctrine of direct effect. The CJEU has found that provided they are sufficiently clear, precise,
and unconditional the provisions of directives can be relied upon before Member State courts as against
the Member State only (that is, not individuals), but only where their deadline for implementation has
passed and the Member State has not properly implemented them (Case C-71/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office
[1974] ECR 1337 (ECLI:EU:C:1974:133); Case C-148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR
1629 (ECLI:EU:C:1979:110)). By contrast the CJEU has found that regulations are capable of being relied
upon before Member State courts as against the Member State and individuals, as appropriate, from the
date they enter into force and become applicable (as specified in the specific instrument) (Case C-39/72
Commission v. Italy [1973] ECR 101 (ECLI:EU:C:1973:13)).
114 In the case of the UK, for example, the Clinical Trials Directive was adopted into domestic law by its trans-
position through the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, Statutory Instrument
No. 1031/2004.
115 Recital 82 Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96. Article 168(4)(c) provides the base for ‘measures
setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal products and devices for medical use’. Article
168(4)(c) is a derogation to Article 6(a), as per Article 2(5) TFEU which provides for EU action to support,
coordinate or supplement the Member States, and is in accordance with Article 4(2)(k), which provides for
shared competence in ‘respect of common safety concerns in public health matters’ (emphasis added).
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respectively.116 Safeguarding morality and ethics, a key facet of the imagined future to
be brought into being by the Clinical Trials Regulation, is reflected in the focus in this
legal foundation on ensuring product safety within the internal market.117 It is on this
basis that safeguarding morality and ethics provides a ‘bioethical stamp’ that ensures
that products can be legitimately marketed within the internal market.
The Clinical Trials Regulation also makes extensive reference to the ‘protection of
trial subjects’.118 A key recital to the Clinical Trials Regulation references the Clini-
cal Trials Directive’s ‘extensive set of rules for the protection of subjects’ and states
‘[t]hese rules should be upheld’.119 The key facet of safeguarding morality and ethics
is reflected in these protections and its foundation—noted in the recital as stemming
from ‘[h]uman dignity and the right to the integrity of the person’ as recognized in the
EU Charter.120
Specific protections include risk assessment based on the results of toxicological
experiments prior to any clinical trial, screening by research ethics committees and
Member States’ competent authorities, and rules on the protection of personal data.121
These protections underscore that in respect of gene-editing technologies, as it is more
generally, safeguarding morality and ethics is usually seen as a field to be dealt with at
the national level.122
A principle way in which safeguarding morality and ethics are assured comes
through the stress on informed consent. The key recital on informed consent states how
the ‘[EU] Charter requires that any intervention in the field of biology and medicine
cannot be performed without free and informed consent of the person concerned’.123
There are references to informed consent throughout the Clinical Trials Regulation,124
including additional protections for those who are incapable of giving legal consent to
participate in clinical trials (which includes children).125
The rules on good clinical practice (GCP) found in further legislation126 (which will
be replaced in line with the application of the Clinical Trials Regulation127) provides
another area where the safeguarding of morality and ethics is further inflected. This
legislation is supplemented by detailed guidance established by the EMA (the EU
counterpart to the US Food and Drugs Administration), in accordance with the Inter-
national Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration
116 Recital 82, Id.
117 Recital 8, Id.
118 Chapter V, Id.
119 Recital 27, Id.
120 Id.
121 Recital 67, Id.
122 Mariachiara Tallacchini, Governing by Values. EU Ethics: Soft Tool, Hard Effects, 47 Minerva 281 (2009).
123 Recital 27 Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96.
124 For instance: Recitals 15, 17, 44, 76, and 80, Article 3, and Ch. V (on protection of subjects and informed
consent), Id.
125 Especially Article 31 and Article 32, Id.
126 Directive 2005/28/EC Laying Down Principles and Detailed Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice as
Regards Investigational Medicinal Products for Human Use, as well as the Requirements for Authorization
of the Manufacturing or Importation of Such Products, OJ 2005 L 91/13.
127 For the state of play at time of publication, see European Commission, Implementation measures by the
Commission in the Context of Regulation (EU) No 536/2014—Overview and State of Play, http://ec.eu
ropa.eu/health/files/clinicaltrials/overview_clinical_trials.pdf (accessed Sep. 24, 2020).
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of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (usually referred to as simply ‘ICH’).128 GCP, in
addition to good laboratory practice relating to early stages clinical trials carried out in
laboraties, focuses on the rights of individual trial subjects ensuring the ‘rights, safety,
dignity and well-being of subjects are protected and prevail over all other interests’.129
The EU database mentioned above collates information on the content, commence-
ment, and termination of clinical trials. This information is subject to protections for
confidentiality and invokes the right to privacy—which again reflects the safeguarding
of morality and ethics. Cross-references to EU data protection legislation130 are also
embedded throughout EU law on clinical trials. The protection of individual privacy
essentially serves to legitimate the focus on regulating for product safety.
Overall, therefore, the Clinical Trials Regulation embeds and reflects the safeguard-
ing of morality and ethics as a key facet of the framing of EU-level legal regulation of
gene-editing technologies. This is apparent in the framing of the Clinical Trials Regula-
tion itself and its legal bases; in the specific provisions on protections; related legislation
and guidance; and systems for implementation. The safeguarding of morality and ethics
through these legitimates the Clinical Trials Regulation, in particular as it applies to
gene-editing technologies.
Read together, the Biotechnology Directive, the current FP for research funding, and
the Clinical Trials Regulation suggest how there has been sufficient consensus across
the EU’s Member States to build the safeguarding of morality and ethics as a key facet
of the imagined future to be brought into being through EU-level legal regulation. The
issue of morality and ethics generally, as well as in relation to gene-editing technologies,
is usually seen as a field to be dealt with at the national level.131 For example, the
European Commission considers that ‘regulating on ethical matters is the competence
of Member States’.132
Nevertheless, at least in respect of the examples discussed here, the backdrop of
broadly shared historical experiences of eugenics and human enhancement among
EU Member States,133 and the need to ensure the functioning of the internal market,
has helped to justify harmonization—although limited—of morality and ethics. This
underlines how imagined futures ‘are also built from imaginaries of the past’.134 The
EU’s legislature has chosen to ensure that the safeguarding of morality and ethics is
made part of the EU-level collective imaginary and, in turn, reflected in the framing
of EU law. In doing so, it is possible to limit the potential for a repeat of the past. In
reflecting concerns about the past, the facet of safeguarding morality and ethics helps
to justify and legitimate the harmonization of morality and ethics at the EU level of
governance.135
128 EMA, E6: Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, CPMP/ICH/135/95.
129 Article 3(a), Regulation (EU) 536/2014, supra note 96 (emphasis added).
130 Currently: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1.
131 Tallacchini, supra note 122.
132 European Commission, Report on Embryonic Stem Cell Research Provides Basis for Discussion on Ethics
(2003), IP/03/506.
133 See supra note 31.
134 Beckert, supra note 19, at 91.
135 Tallacchini, supra note 122.
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IV. THIRD KEY FACET: PURSUING MEDICAL OBJECTIVES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH
The third and final key facet of the imaginary built into the framing of EU-level legal
regulation for gene-editing technologies regards the pursuit of medical objectives for
the protection of human health. This key facet is apparent in EU legislation relating to
patents and the marketing of ATMPs.
IV. A. Patents
The recitals framing the Biotechnology Directive also provide a separate medical
treatment exception that methods of therapeutic, diagnostic, and surgical treatment
on the human or animal body are not patentable in the EU’s internal market.136 This
also applies to such methods involving gene-editing. For humanitarian reasons, these
methods are not to be deemed inventions capable of patent protection. Physicans
and healthcare workers should not be prevented from providing suitable medical
treatment to patients. The medical and public health benefit of these methods overrides
arguments for their status as potential patentable inventions.137 However, a distinction
is made between medical methods and medical products. This exception does not
cover medical products with therapeutic, diagnostic, or surgical purposes. As such it
is possible to obtain patents for ‘products’ used in therapeutic, diagnostic, and surgical
‘methods’. Put differently, it is the methods themselves, rather than products used in
such methods, that are excluded from patentability.138 The pursuit of medical objec-
tives for the protection of human health, manifest in this exclusion on patentability, is
a key facet of the imaginary built into the framing and provisions of the Biotechnology
Directive.
The exclusion from patentability of therapeutic, diagnostic, and surgical treatment
methods practised on the human body means that their developers are not able to
exclusively benefit from their commercialization, and that they can be used widely by
third parites without the need for a licence of exploitation. Despite excluding methods
of therapeutic, diagnostic, and surgical treatment from patentability, the Biotechnology
Directive still provides scope to obtain patent protection for gene-editing technologies.
That is, provided they are ‘not’ medical methods practised on the human body (in vivo)
and ‘not’ contrary to its other provisions on ‘ordre public’ and morality (as discussed
above). There is, in short, the potential for patentability of gene-editing technologies
(including limited in vitro methods), but not the ‘methods’ that use and deploy them
directly on the human body (in vivo). The distinction between medical products and
medical methods potentially steers the commercial trajectory of gene-editing technolo-
gies toward the former. The pursuit of medical objectives for the protection of human
136 Recital 35 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33 mirroring Article 53(c) European Patent Convention 2000.
The former states the ‘Directive shall be without prejudice to the provisions of national patent law whereby
processes for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised
on the human or animal body are excluded from patentability’. For discussion, see: Wong and Mahalatchimy,
supra note 39.
137 As mentioned earlier, medical benefits also constitute an exception to the limitations on the patentability
of inventions using human embyos for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes.
138 Recital 35 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33; Article 53(c) European Convention on the Grant of
European Patents (European Patent Convention). See also: Phoebe H. Li, 3D Bioprinting Technologies:
Patents, Innovation and Access, 6 Law Innov. Technol. 282 (2014).
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health, as a facet of the imaginary built into the framing of the Biotechnology Directive,
underpins this distinction and in turn legitimates the legislation.
The value of gene-editing patents can also be limited by other legal provisions,
including those relating to marketing. Indeed, the Biotechnology Directive is clear
that a ‘patent for invention does not authorize the holder to implement that invention,
but merely entitles him to prohibit third parties from exploiting it for industrial and
commercial purposes’.139 The Directive builds on this, in relation to marketing, to state:
‘ . . . consequently, substantive patent law cannot serve to replace or render superfluous
national, European or international law which may impose restrictions or prohibitions or which
concerns the monitoring of research and of the use or commercialisation of its results,
notably from the point of view of the requirements of public health, safety, environmental
protection, animal welfare, the preservation of genetic diversity and compliance with certain
ethical standards.’140
For the purposes of this provision, ‘European law’ can be understood to encompass EU
law. As we turn next to explain, EU law also regulates the marketing of gene-editing
technologies. The Biotechnology Directive does not replace the following or make it
superfluous.
IV. B. Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products
Gene-editing technologies are likely to fall under the EU’s ATMP Regulation.141 This
piece of legislation provides gene-editing technologies with the regulatory pathway
toward marketing across the EU’s Member States, which comprise the territory of
the internal market. Patent holders have exclusive rights to the marketing of their
products—and they can grant licences to others to market products that make use of
patented inventions. In terms of the products, which may or may nor be subject to a
patent, the scope of the ATMP Regulation is particularly important. For that reason, in
what follows, we focus our attention on the scope, benefits, and practical limits of this
pathway to marketing gene-editing technologies under the ATMP Regulation.
The ATMP Regulation covers gene therapy medicinal products, somatic cell ther-
apy medicinal products, tissue engineered products, and combined ATMPs (bringing
together one of the first three categories with a medical device).142 These catagories of
medicinal products must be ‘either prepared industrially or manufactured by a method
involving an industrial process’ and ‘intended to be placed on the market in Member
States’.143
Among the legal category of ATMPs, medicinal products based on gene-editing
technologies may be classified as gene therapy medicinal products144 although this
139 Recital 14 Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99.
142 Article 2, Id.
143 Article 2 Directive 2001/83/EC, supra note 102.
144 Article 2.1 Part IV of Annex I Directive 2001/83/EC, Id., provides gene therapy medicinal products as
‘a biological medicinal product which has the following charcateristics: (a) it contains an active substance
which contains or consists of a recombinant nucleic acid used in or administered to human beings with
a view to regulating, repairing, replacing, adding or deleting a genetic sequence; (b) its therapeutic,
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pathway may not be easy to navigate.145 The ATMP Regulation focuses on gene
therapies containing or consisting of recombinant nucleic acid. Consequently, Mourby
and Morrison suggest that nucleic acids not produced by recombination, and protein-
based molecules which are also gene-editing techniques, may fall outside the scope of
the definition of gene therapy medicinal products within the ATMP Regulation.146
Nevertheless, it appears the Committee for Advanced Therapies, which provides sci-
entific recommendations on the legal classification of ATMPs, have already made a
wide application of the definition of gene therapy medicinal products beyond the clear
presence of recombinant nucleic acid.147
Where genetically modified cells are being developed for manufacturing purposes
in the development of medicinal products, and do not use the target genetic sequence
for therapeutic use, the resulting products based on gene-editing techniques will be
classified as cell therapy medicinal products or tissue engineered products. Where
genetically modified cells do use the target genetic sequence for therapeutic use, the
medicinal products based on gene-editing techniques will be classified as gene therapy
medicinal products.148 Finally, where a product falls within the definitions of both
somatic cell therapy medicinal products and gene therapy medicinal products, or tissue
engineered products and gene therapy medicinal products, it shall be considered as a
gene therapy medicinal product.149
In case of any doubt as to the potential applicability of the EU’s Medical Devices
Regulations150 to a gene-editing technology that has a medical device component, the
ATMP Regulation provides:
‘whatever the role of the medical device, the pharmacological, immunological or
metabolic action of these cells or tissues should be considered to be the principal mode
of action of the combination product. Such combination products should always be
regulated under this Regulation.’151
prophylactic or diagnostic effect relates directly to the recombinant nucleic acide sequence it contains, or
to the product of genetic expression of this sequence’.
145 Martina C. Cornel et al., Moving Towards a Cure in Genetics: What is Needed to Bring Somatic Gene Therapy
to the Clinic?, 27 Eur. J. Hum. Genet. 484 (2019).
146 Miranda Mourby and Michael Morrison, Gene Therapy Regulation: Could In-Body Editing Fall Through the
Net?, 28 Eur. J. Hum. Genet. 979 (2020).
147 Id.
148 EMA, Draft Guideline on Quality, Non-Clinical and Clinical Aspects of Medicinal Products Containing Geneti-
cally Modified Cells (2018), EMA/CAT/GTWP/671639/2008 Rev. 1.
149 Article 2(5) Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99.
150 Within the EU, the applicable law is subject to transition from a trio of directives to a duo of regu-
lations, which are due to apply fully from May 26, 2021: Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on Medical
Devices, Amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No
1223/2009 and Repealing Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, OJ 2017 L117/1; Regulation (EU)
2017/746 on In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices and Repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Decision
2010/227/EU, OJ 2017 L117/176. Implementation of this legislation is left to national competent author-
ities, including, at the time of writing, the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.
The competent authorities designate notified bodies to assess medical device conformity with ‘essential
requirements’. The focus in conformity assessments is on the intended purpose and risk of a device. Where
a conformity assessment finds a medical device to be compliant with the regulations, the manufacturer of
the device can brand it with the CE (Conformité Européenne) mark and trade it within the EU internal
market.
151 Recital 4 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99.
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The centralized procedure involving the EMA is applicable to gene-editing technolo-
gies (falling within the scope of the ATMP Regulation). This procedure is compul-
sory for products derived from biotechnology (which obviously includes gene-editing
ATMPs).152 Products that represent a significant scientific, therapeutic, or technical
innovation or that benefit public health can also make use of this route to marketing.
The centralized procedure gives access to the entire market of the EU and means that
procedures available for other kinds of medicinal products, which require multiple
applications for their marketing in several EU Member States, can be avoided.153
Beyond the centralized procedure, the ATMP Regulation provides other legal incen-
tives to foster the marketing of these products. These include harmonized scientific
guidelines;154 and a reduction in the fees payable to the EMA for the provision of
scienctific data, amounting to a 90 per cent reduction for small and medium sized
enterprises and a 65 per cent reduction for other applicants.155
Consistent with the safeguard clauses under Article 114 TFEU, which permit tem-
porary measures deviating from EU legislation adopted under it by Member States,156
the ATMP legislation includes a safeguard clause for public health grounds.157 Public
policy and public morality grounds are also available to prohibit ATMPs, but they can
be used only exceptionally.158 More specifically, the ATMP Regulation provides:
‘The regulation of advanced therapy medicinal products at Community level should not
interfere with decisions made by Member States on whether to allow the use of any specific type
of human cells, such as embryonic stem cells, or animal cells. It should also not affect the
application of national legislation prohibiting or restricting the sale, supply or use of medicinal
products containing, consisting of or derived from these cells.’159
In relation to public morality, part of the key facet of the imaginary found in the framing
of EU-level legal regulation (ie safeguarding morality and ethics), there is jurisprudence
on the specific Article 36 TFEU public morality derogation to the free movement of
goods under Article 34 TFEU. According to this jurisprudence, it remains ‘for each
Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form
152 Regulation (EC) 726/2004 Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorization and Supervi-
sion of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency,
OJ 2004 L 136/1.
153 These procedures are the decentralized procedure, the mutual recognition procedure and the national
procedures. See: Flear, supra note 17; Mahalatchimy, supra note 27.
154 For instance for each kind of ATMP, GCP, good manufacturing practices, good pharmacovigilance prac-
tices.
155 Article 16 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99.
156 See Flear, supra note 17.
157 Article 20(4) Regulation (EC) 726/2004, supra note 152 on the centralized procedure states: ‘Where
urgent action is essential to protect human health or the environment, a Member State may, on its own initiative
or at the European Commission’s request, suspend the use in its territory of a medicinal product for human
use which has been authorized in accordance with this Regulation’ (emphasis added).
158 Recital 7 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99 states as regards ‘any specific type of human cells’
the ATMP Regulation ‘should also not affect the application of national legislation prohibiting or restricting
the sale, supply or use of medicinal products containing, consisting of or derived from these cells’. Recital 13
states: ‘Member States should be able exceptionally to prohibit the use in their territory of medicinal products
for human use which infringe objectively defined concepts of public policy and public morality’ (emphasis added).
159 Recital 7 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
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selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory’.160 Consistency in the
treatment of domestically and imported goods is essential for the successful use of this
derogation.161 The latter is therefore available to prohibit ATMPs that make use of,
for example, embryonic stem cells. The narrow scope of these grounds for temporary
national measures ensures a focus on product safety for marketing. Moral and ethical
concerns, for instance, can provide scope to exclude certain gene-editing ATMPs from
a national market, but there is limited scope for using these.
More broadly, the ATMP Regulation does not explicitly prohibit the marketing of
germline gene-editing technologies—or simply their use. There was an attempt by the
European Parliament to include a provision in the ATMP Regulation that there could
be no marketing authorization granted to ATMPs modifying the human germ line.
However, these amendments were rejected by the Council of Ministers.162
Still, in order to be marketed as ATMPs, gene-editing technologies, like any other
ATMP or indeed medicinal product,163 require clinical trials data that demonstrate
their quality, safety, and efficacy. There can be no marketing of ATMPs without clinical
trials data. As discussed above, the Clinical Trials Regulation provides a clear prohi-
bition on gene therapy clinical trials resulting in modifications to the subject’s germ
line genetic identity. The latter prohibition would seem to preclude the marketing of
ATMPs that modify the human germ line when linked to relevant EU law.
This interpretation gains added credibility given the ATMP Regulation states:
‘This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles reflected in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and also takes into account
the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine.’164
As we noted above, the EU Charter also provides that the ATMP Regulation, as EU law,
must also be interpreted consistently with it, and this includes its provisions on human
dignity and integrity of the person.165 The latter provision, Article 3, provides that in
the field of medicine and biology, ‘the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular
those aiming at the selection of persons, the prohibition on making the human body
and its parts as such a source of financial gain, and the prohibition of the reproductive
cloning of human beings’ must be respected.
In short, when read in light of the Clinical Trials Regulation and the EU Charter, it
seems that it is not possible to use the ATMP Regulation to market ATMPs that modify
the human germ line. The provisions in these instruments, when read together, appear
160 Case C-34/79 Regina v. Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby [1979] ECR 3795
(ECLI:EU:C:1979:295), at para. 15 (emphasis added).
161 Case C-121/85 Conegate Limited v. HM Customs & Excise [1986] ECR 1007 (ECLI:EU:C:1986:114).
162 European Commision, Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products and Amending DIRECTIVE 2001/83/EC, and Regulation
(EC) 726/2004 (2006) (COM(2005)0567—COD2005/0227).
163 As Recital 6 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99 states the ATMP is a ‘lex specialis, which
introduces additional provisions to those laid down’ in DIRECTIVE 2001/83/EC, supra note 102.
164 Recital 8 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99.
165 See supra note 77.
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to effectively prohibit ATMPs that involve the modification of the human germ line,
despite the lack of explicit exclusion in the ATMP Regulation itself. As such, the pursuit
of medical objectives for the protection of health, as framed within EU law, legitimates
the development of human somatic gene-editing technologies by opposition to human
germline gene-editing technologies.
Yet, the scope of the ATMP Regulation is limited to specific kinds of medicinal
products, as the definition of its scope makes clear. As such, the ATMP Regulation
does not prohibit the marketing of products that are not manufactured at the industrial
scale or ‘other than’ medicinal products. Indeed, this would depend on the specific
instruments and provisions of EU law and/or national laws applicable to the products in
question. Nor does the ATMP Regulation, as recognized in its recitals, ‘interfere with
decisions made by Member States on whether to allow the use of any specific type of
human cells, such as embryonic stem cells, or animal cells’.166
This provision encompasses the use of one type of cells that are specifically not
capable of being patented under the Biotechnology Directive (embryonic stem cells).
The provision also seems to permit the use of both somatic and germ line cells,
irrespective of whether they have been edited. Nevertheless, the classification of cell
therapy medicinal products in the ATMP Regulation as somatic cell therapy medicinal
product explicitly shows the intent to exclude medicinal products based on embryonic
or germ line cells therapy from the cell therapy medicinal products legal category
among ATMP, as long as neither embryonic cells nor germ line cells are somatic cells.
Given the specific prohibition in the Clinical Trials Regulation, ‘use’ here appears to
be for purposes ‘other than’ clinical trials for medicinal products, including ATMPs.
‘Use’ could, therefore, encompass other kinds of clinical and preclinical research for
purposes other than the marketing of medicinal products, ie falling outside the scope
of the Clinical Trials Regulation (noted above).
As with the other examples of EU legislation applicable to gene-editing technologies
considered above, the overarching focus of the ATMP Regulation is on marketing, since
it was adopted under Article 114 TFEU on the internal market. This is apparent in the
rationale for ensuring that ATMPs are subject to the centralized procedure:
‘This procedure should also be compulsory for advanced therapy medicinal products
in order to overcome the scarcity of expertise in the Community, ensure a high level
of scientific evaluation of these medicinal products in the Community, preserve the
confidence of patients and medical professions in the evaluation and facilitate Community
market access for these innovative technologies.’167
The Biotechnology Directive and ATMP Regulation set-up specific frames regarding
gene-editing-based technologies used for the pursuit of medical objectives for the
protection of human health. The former provides limited scope for patentability, specif-
ically, by allowing patents on products rather than methods in the medical field. This
in turn facilitates the wide use of gene-editing methods of therapeutic, diagnostic, and
surgical treatment on the human or animal body. This can be done without the need for
costly licences from patent holders, while at the same time promoting the development
166 Recital 7 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
167 Recital 9, Id. (emphasis added).
28 • Framing and legitimating EU legal regulation of human gene-editing technologies
of products based on gene-editing, which may be patentable. The ATMP Regulation
provides various incentives for the marketing of such products, not least the centralized
marketing authorization procedure.
Both the Biotechnology Directive and ATMP Regulation reflect the importance
that is given to pursuing medical objectives for the protection of human health as
a key facet of the imaginary built into the framing of EU-level regulation of gene-
editing technologies. As a key facet of the EU-level imaginary embedded in framing,
pursuing these objectives further legitimates and justifies regulation prohibiting the
development of medicines modifying the human germ line genetic identity.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we illuminated the three key facets of the imaginary found in the framing
of instruments of legal regulation in respect of human gene-editing technologies at the
EU level of governance. These facets are the tension around naturalness; safeguarding
morality and ethics; and the pursuit of medical objectives for the protection of human
health. These facets are distributed between various legal instruments, which when
looked at together, make it possible to view a multifaceted imaginary or imagined future
across them.
Our analysis makes clear that this imaginary conjures into being a future in which
technoscience within the EU is steered toward particular innovations, ie which exploit
human somatic gene editing for new medicinal products, but avoid editing of the
human germ line itself for new medicinal products. This analysis suggests how the EU’s
legislature behaves in the way Jasanoff explains: ‘it often falls to legislators, courts, the
media, or other institutions of power to elevate some imagined futures above others, accord-
ing them a dominant position for policy purposes’.168 We have not sought to reveal the
various possible alternative futures that may be reflected in, for example, consultations
and proposals for new legislation on gene-editing technologies, or different iterations
of legislation through the legislative process.
Nevertheless, our analysis has shown that the three facets appear together in only
one of the legal instruments applicable to human gene-editing technologies, ie the
Biotechnology Directive. One explanation for this may be that the Biotechnology
Directive is the oldest instrument among the legislation applicable to gene-editing
technologies. The long process of adoption for this text established for the first time key
limitations for the patentability of biotechnologies. The latter comprise the key facets
of the EU-level imaginary built into the framing of the Biotechnology Directive. The
inclusion of such key limitations and facets may have been more necessary at the time
of the adoption of the Biotechnology Directive in 1998, in order to legitimate internal
market legislation, and given the absence of a specific legal base for public health before
1999.169 The EU-level imaginary found in the framing of the Biotechnology Directive
has been gradually strengthened in the subsequent legislation applicable to human
gene-editing technologies.
168 Dreamscapes of modernity, supra note 20, at 4 (emphasis added). The focus here on ‘imagined futures’
tallies with Beckert, supra note 19 and affirms our view of a single imaginary at the EU level.
169 When ensuring a high level of human health protection ‘in the definition and implementation of all Union
policies and activities’ was included by the Treaty of Amsterdam (entering into force in 1999) under what
is now Article 168(1) TFEU and was previously Article 152 European Community Treaty.
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The market-oriented focus of the legislation applicable to gene-editing technologies,
and the importance of the imaginary to its legitimation, can be explained in large part
by its adoption under Article 114 TFEU, the legal base for internal market legislation.
This underscores the weakness of Article 168 TFEU, the EU’s supporting competence
in the public health field.170 Article 114 provides far greater scope for the adoption of
harmonization measures. EU law relating to clinical trials provides the sole exception
among the legislation discussed, since it was adopted under Article 114 and Article
168(4)(c).
Article 168(4)(c), as a buttress for Article 114, underscores the weakness of Article
168 TFEU, and the overriding rationale and justification for the legislation adopted by
the EU’s legislature: product safety for marketability. The strength of Article 114, and
the buttress of Article 168(4)(c), thus help to explain the market-oriented focus of legal
regulation on gene-editing technologies at the EU level of governance.
What, then, does the imagined future assembled from facets found in the framing
of EU-level legal regulation actually do? The analysis in this article further under-
scores how the concept of imaginaries, as McNeil and colleagues argue, ‘seems to offer
new ways to investigate the relationships among science, technology, and society’.171
In particular, by steering, or restricting, limiting, and directing the development of
human gene-editing technologies, the imaginary discussed in this article can be seen
to play an important regulatory function for the internal market. This function occurs
through the framing of EU legal instruments. That is, the imaginary does not play a
role in itself, independent from framing; nor does it function alongside framing as an
epiphenomenon.
The imaginary built into framing also plays a significant role in legitimating the
market-oriented focus of legal regulation at the EU level. Specifically, through its
concretization in various safeguards and limitations, and individual protections, the
imaginary places a ‘bioethical stamp’ on the development pipeline and human gene-
editing technologies eventually authorized as ATMPs for marketing purposes. This is
apparent in a few key areas in various pieces of EU legislation, including what types
of products and processes can benefit from a monopoly of exploitation via patents;
what kinds of research activities can be funded by the EU; the definition of GMOs
and how they can be safely commercialized; the performance of clinical trials; and the
marketing of human gene-editing based ATMPs. Whether the legitimating function of
the imaginary is successful or, relatedly, more significant than the regulatory function,
is an empirical question of the kind that is outside the scope of the more normative
analysis this article has aimed to provide.
Finally, the analysis also contributes to broader reflections on our starting point
in this article: developments in gene editing around the world. The multifaceted
imaginary found in EU-level regulation may serve to contrast the EU, and its imagined
170 Recent understandings of Article 168 TFEU suggest that it can be augmented as part of a web of compe-
tences, including Article 114 TFEU—see: Kai P. Purnhagen et al., More Competences than You Knew? The
Web of Health Competence for European Union Action in Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak, 11 Eur. J. Risk
Reg. 297 (2020).
171 Maureen C. McNeil et al., Conceptualizing Imaginaries of Science, Technology and Society, in The Handbook
of Science and Technology Studies 435 (Ulrike Felt et al. eds., 4th ed. 2017).
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future and identity,172 with that taking shape elsewhere, currently perhaps especially
in China.173 Most notably, in restricting human germ-line editing, the imaginary of
the EU, and its identity, has a particular orientation toward ethics and human rights,
and their relations to markets.174 This seems to stem from the particular negative
experiences of eugenics and human enhancement in Europe. These experiences are not
merely historical, but continue to be reflected in the imaginary found in the framing
of EU-level of regulation and in concrete provisions, especially in the safeguards and
limitations on the development of human gene-editing technologies, and individual
protections for those involved in research processes.
The framings of legal regulation are not simply about what happens (or does not)
here and now. They entail imagined futures, which, through their iteration in the
framing of legal regulation and the shaping of specific provisions, are performed and
brought into being.
172 For a similar argument on the relationship between law and identity, see Christopher Harding, The Identity
of European Law: Mapping Out the European Legal Space, 6 Eur. Law J. 128 (2000).
173 Jon Cohen and Nirja Desai, With its CRISPR Revolution, China Becomes a World Leader in Genome
Editing, Science (2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/08/its-crispr-revolution-china-be
comes-world-leader-genome-editing (accessed Apr. 3, 2020).
174 Relatedly, see: Flear, supra note 17.
